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I.

Introduction
After initially rejecting negotiated outcomes as incompatible with its broad mandate, the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) eventually amended its Rules
of Procedure and Evidence to add plea-bargaining to its procedural toolbox. Furthermore, the
normative framework of the International Criminal Court (ICC) also allows for the possibility of
concluding plea agreements which avoid the proceedings on the merits. These possibilities raise
the question of whether negotiated outcomes in criminal proceedings compromise the goals of
international criminal justice, namely the duty to prosecute, the principle of just desert, the
establishment of a historical record, and the realization of the victim’s interest. Part II of this
Article attempts to define plea-bargaining and conducts an overview of the origins of pleabargaining including its role in the international realm. Part III analyzes the compatibility and
desirability of plea-bargaining in light of the purpose and mandate of international criminal
tribunals. Finally, Part IV discusses whether the risk of plea-bargaining compromising the goals
of international justice can be outweighed by arguments of administrative efficiency.
II.

Plea-Bargaining

1.

An Attempt to Define
Providing an accurate and comprehensive definition of plea-bargaining is virtually an

impossible task given its multitudinous forms of appearance. The practice most commonly
consists of a negotiation between the accused and the prosecution - without the participation of a
judge competent to decide the case on its merits - resulting in a plea agreement. The accused
either concedes certain facts or admits guilt, thus waiving the possibility of being acquitted. The
accused also gives up the benefit of having the state bear the burden of proof to establish the
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accused’s guilt at trial. In return, the prosecutor may reduce or modify the charges (charge
bargaining), the sentence (sentence bargaining), or both. Charge bargaining commonly takes
two forms: the prosecutor can either reduce or dismiss charges and amend the indictment
accordingly. Sentence bargaining on the other hand is typically based on the promise to either
recommend a sentence or sentencing range to the judge(s) or not to oppose a request by the
accused for a particular sentence.1
2.

Origins and Prevalence of Plea-Bargaining

a)

The United States: The Cradle of Plea-Bargaining
To say that plea-bargaining is an institution of the common law system unknown to the

continental legal tradition is too much of a generalization. Some common law countries do not
use plea-bargaining at all,2 while other countries with an adversarial legal system, such as
England and Israel, place little importance on its role in the judicial process.3
Plea-bargaining is far more prevalent, however, in the United States than in any other
country.4 The United States Supreme Court has described plea-bargaining as “an essential
component of the administration of justice.”5 Guilty plea rates of above 90%, and sometimes
even 95%, are proof of the extraordinary dominance of plea-bargaining in American

1

MARK E. CAMMACK & NORMAN M. GARLAND, ADVANCED CRIMINAL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 270-272
(Thomson-West Nutshell Series, 2006)(2d ed. 2006); Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 48 (Dec. 2,
2003) (sentencing judgment); see, e.g., Rule 62ter (A) Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International
Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, IT/32/Rev. 39 (Sept. 22, 2006) [hereinafter ICTYRPE].
2
For example, South Africa.
3
Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: The Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 46-49 (2002).
4
George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1012-1013 (2000).
5
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971).
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courtrooms.6 However, even in countries where plea-bargaining is the primary mode of settling
cases, such as the United States, it is used less frequently in the most serious and notorious
cases.7
b)

Use of Plea-Bargaining: Bruising Continental Legal Sensibilities?
Even though the American practice of using formal plea agreements does not exist in

most civil law countries, a weaker form of negotiated justice can still be found in different
European countries.8 For instance, some procedural laws contain the institution of “confession,”
which is an admission of guilt made by the accused during the investigation or the trial. This
admission of guilt, however, cannot be equated with a “guilty plea” in the American system. A
confession does not relieve the court of its responsibilities to determine whether the confession is
credible and supported by corroborating evidence.9 The accused’s confession is “simply part of
the evidence to be considered and evaluated by the court”10 and has no effect on the adjudication
of the case on its merits. In most countries, however, the court does have the discretion to
consider a confession as a mitigating factor when assessing the sentence.11
While confessions can trigger an effect similar to sentence bargaining, thereby producing
a certain convergence between countries with and without plea-bargaining, the idea of charge

6

Fisher, supra note 4, at 1012-1013.
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 47 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
8
See Françoise Tulkens, La justice négociée, in Mireille Delmas-Marty, PROCÉDURES PÉNALES D’EUROPE 551-583
(1995) (overview of the elements of negotiated justice (justice négociée) in the criminal procedures of continental
Europe).
9
Michael Bohlander, Plea-Bargaining before the ICTY, in Richard May et al., ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK MCDONALD, 151, 151, 159 (2001).
10
Prosecutor v. Erdemoviü, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶ 7 (Oct. 7, 1997) (separate and dissenting opinion of Judge
Cassese).
11
The Swiss Supreme Court handles confessions as a mitigating factor and accords a so-called “confession
discount” (up to 30% reduction of the sentence if the confession is made in an early stage of the proceedings).
7
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bargaining still “bruises continental legal sensibilities.”12 Charge bargaining contradicts the
fundamental purpose of the criminal trial, which is to establish the “material truth,” not simply
the truth put forward by the parties’ arguments and evidence.13 Also, the strict adherence in
criminal affairs to the iura novit curia principle is incompatible with charge bargaining, which
results in a reduction of the charges to a lesser crime.14
3.

Appearance of Plea-Bargaining in the Realm of International Justice
The architects of the procedural framework for the ICTY, ICTR, and ICC all pursued a

similar construction plan. They blended accusatorial features of the common law system with
elements of the inquisitorial tradition of the civil law system while taking into account the
standards of international human rights law.15 This task was all the more difficult since an
appropriate balance between different national legal traditions and values had to be found while
taking into account the special mandate and nature of an international trial where the accused are
charged with the gravest of all crimes. An analysis of whether plea-bargaining is appropriate in
the realm of international justice demonstrates the difficulty in balancing the different legal
traditions amidst the goals and nature of international criminal tribunals.
a)

Plea-Bargaining at the ICTY
Initially, the ICTY found that plea-bargaining would be incompatible with its unique

mandate and purpose. The judges at the ICTY decided to reject a proposal made by the United

12

Mirjan Damaška, Negotiated Justice in International Criminal Courts, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 1018, 1024
(2004).
13
See Bohlander, supra note 9, at 159. In Switzerland the “formal truth” (formelle Wahrheit), the facts agreed upon
by the parties, is controlling in civil proceedings while in criminal cases the “material truth” (materielle Wahrheit)
has to be established by the court through the evaluation of the available evidence.
14
See id. at 160.
15
Helen Brady, The System of Evidence in the Statute of the International Criminal Court, in ESSAYS ON THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 279, 281 (William A. Schabas & Flavia Lattanzi eds., 1999).
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States Government that would have permitted providing immunity to any accused offering
substantial cooperation.16 In February 1994, Judge Cassese of Italy, then President of the ICTY,
emphasized the special mandate of the ad hoc court:
We have always to keep in mind that this Tribunal is not a municipal court but one that is
charged with genocide, torture, murder, sexual assault, wanton destruction, persecution
and other inhumane acts. After due reflection, we have decided that no one should be
immune from prosecution for crimes such as these, no matter how useful their testimony
may otherwise be.17
It was not until December 2001 that the ICTY adopted plea agreement procedures under
Rule 62ter ICTY-RPE.18 This Rule formalized a practice of the court that emerged in different
variations and degrees in the cases of Erdemoviü, Jelisiü, Todoroviü, Sikirica, Došen, and
Kolundzija.19 One explanation for this about-face can be found in the ICTY’s growing docket
due to the increased arrests of more senior leaders coupled with an upcoming efficiency and
completion strategy discussion outlining a tighter schedule for the Tribunal.20 Also, United States
Judge McDonald’s replacement of Judge Cassese as President of the ICTY added to the
momentum for change, as she was in strong favor of increasing the use of plea-bargaining at the
ICTY.21
The concept of the guilty plea per se is the peculiar product of the adversarial
system of the common law which recognises the advantage it provides to the
public in minimising costs, in the saving of court time…. This common law
institution of the guilty plea should, in our view, find a ready place in an
international criminal forum such as the International Tribunal confronted by
16

Michael P. Scharf, Trading Justice for Efficiency, Plea-Bargaining and International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUSTICE 1070, 1073 (2004).
17
Statement by the President of the ICTY Made at a Briefing to Members of Diplomatic Missions, IT/29, 11
February 1994, reprinted in AN INSIDER’S GUIDE TO THE ICTY 649, 652 (Virgina Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds.,
1995) (emphasis in the original) [hereinafter Statement by President].
18
The ICTR has also adopted a similar provision. See Art. 62bis ICTR-RPE.
19
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 46 & n.86 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
20
See S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4817th mtg. at 1, 3 U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003) (discussion about
the Tribunal’s efficiency was launched in 1999 with the initiation of an Expert Group by the Secretary General (see
Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operation and Functioning of the International
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, infra note 101)).
21
Scharf, supra note 16, at 1073-1074.
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cases which, by their inherent nature, are very complex and necessarily require
lengthy hearings if they go to trial under stringent financial constraints arising
from allocations made by the United Nations itself dependent upon the
contributions of States.22
Rule 62ter ICTY-RPE, which allows both sentence and charge bargaining, reflects the
unique amalgam between adversarial and inquisitorial procedural elements. Following the more
judge-dominated proceedings of the continental system, the Tribunal judges are not bound by
any plea agreement.23 Thus, the judges retain ultimate control over the outcome unlike American
federal judges who must accept an agreed-upon sentence or otherwise allow a defendant to
withdraw his plea.24 In fact, the Trial Chamber has actually refused the sentence proposal
submitted by the Prosecutor in various cases.25 Whether the discretion given to Tribunal judges
to pull this “emergency brake” will have a chilling effect on the use of plea-agreements is
difficult to say.
b)

ICC: Admission of Guilt
The Rome Statute, which was signed before the ICTY introduced Art. 62ter ICTY-RPE,

contains a trial-avoidance mechanism resembling American plea-bargaining. However, Articles
64(8) and 65 of the Rome Statute neither contain the term “guilty plea” nor the civil law notion
of “confession,” but rather use the expression “proceeding on an admission of guilt.”

26

The

wording chosen was mainly a reaction to the rift between the proponents and the opponents of an

22

Prosecutor v. Erdemoviü, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Joint Separate Opinion of Judge McDonald and Judge Vohrah,
¶ 2 (Oct. 7, 1997).
23
Art. 62ter (B) ICTY-RPE.
24
Combs, supra note 3, at 145.
25
See Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-94-2, ¶ 35 (Feb. 4, 2005) (judgment on sentencing appeal) (appealing Trial
Chamber’s sentence of 23 years imprisonment despite prosecutor’s request that accused only serve 15 years of
imprisonment).
26
Interestingly, the term “to plead not guilty” is used in Article 64(8) Rome Statute to describe a non-admission of
guilt.
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American-style plea-bargaining system during the preparatory stages of the Court.27
Additionally, other measures were used to accommodate concerns by civil law lawyers.
According to Professor Schabas, “erroneous notions by some European lawyers about common
law procedure resulted in the addition of a totally superfluous provision, Article 65(5), to
reassure them that plea negotiations could not bind the Court.”28 This provision, however, may
not be as superfluous as it seems. As Judge Cassese stressed in his dissent in Erdemoviü, “legal
constructs and terms upheld in national law should not be automatically applied in international
law.”29 The simple fact that in some countries practicing plea-bargaining the courts are not
bound by the plea-agreement does not mean that this will automatically be the practice of
international criminal courts.
As will be discussed below, there is a potential conflict between encouraging and
rewarding plea agreements and the victim’s interests. Article 65(4) of the Rome Statute may
reconcile these interests by allowing the Trial Chamber to require the production of additional
evidence, including testimony of victims. The Trial Chamber may even order the trial to proceed
under ordinary trial procedures if a more complete presentation of the facts of the case is
required in the interest of justice and, in particular, in the interests of the victims. This provision
could be aimed at situations where a bargain between the accused and the prosecutor is made and
where sentencing would not give full considerations to the rights and interests of victims.30
Whether this provision will create a desirable balance of interests in the ICC will only be
answered once the court is faced with such a situation.

27

Bohlander, supra note 9, at 157.
WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 150 (2d ed. 2004).
29
Prosecutor v. Erdemoviü, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶ 2 (Oct. 7, 1997) (separate and dissenting opinion of Judge
Cassese).
30
Schabas, supra note 28, at 174.
28
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III.

Plea-Bargaining in the Light of the Goals Pursued by International Justice

A.

The Mandate of International Criminal Courts
In the domestic sphere of criminal law, a variety of theoretical frameworks for explaining

and justifying prosecution and punishment exist. The commonly cited purposes served by
criminal proceedings are retribution/vengeance, deterrence/prevention, rehabilitation, and
restorative justice.31 International criminal courts have a mandate reaching beyond these
traditional goals due to the special nature of these institutions and the extraordinary evil with
which they must deal.
Both the ICTR and the ICTY were established under the Chapter VII powers of the
Security Council, which characterized the situations in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as a
threat to international peace and security.32 In establishing these institutions, the Security Council
found them to be a means to “put an end to such crimes and to take effective measures to bring to
justice the persons who are responsible for them” and was convinced that they “would contribute
to the restoration and maintenance of peace.”33 Other important functions of these courts are the
search for truth and the creation of a historical record, which may forestall denials and end cycles
of violence by identifying a particular individual’s culpability, rather than accusing entire
groups: “Truth is the cornerstone of the rule of law, and it will point towards individuals, not
peoples, as perpetrators of war crimes. And it is only the truth that can cleanse the ethnic and

31

For a critical assessment of transposing these goals of domestic criminal justice to the context of international
justice, see Mirjam J. Aukerman, Extraordinary Evil, Ordinary Crime: A Framework for Understanding
Transitional Justice, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 39 (2002).
32
See S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., at 2 U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) (addressing the ICTY);
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993) (addressing the ICTY); S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., at 1 U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (addressing the ICTR).
33
S.C. Res. 808, at ¶¶ 5-6.
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religious hatreds and begin the healing process.”34 Finally, from a victim’s perspective, the
proceedings can provide a forum where their stories can be heard and their loss and suffering
acknowledged, possibly even resulting in compensation, restitution, or reparations.35
As a general rule,36 the use of plea-bargaining bypasses the proceedings on the merits and
the sole remaining issue is the imposing of an appropriate sentence. Can the unique goals of
international justice nevertheless be realized? Or is plea-bargaining incompatible with the
mandate of international criminal courts? The following section provides an overview on the
range of answers to these questions.
B.

The Compatibility of Plea-Bargaining with the Goals of International Justice

1.

Plea-Bargaining: A Perforation of the Historical Record?

a)

Why the Truth Matters and Whether a Tribunal Can Establish It
One goal of international criminal proceedings is to create an accurate historical record of

wide-scale violations of international law. The establishment of this truth is important in order to
lift the veil of silence from painful and contentious periods of history where denial has often
been pervasive.37 It is the official acknowledgment of events and patterns of violence that helps
to preclude denial and revisionism in the future. The chief prosecutor of the Nuremberg trials,
Justice Jackson, emphasized that the most important legacy of these trials was that they
documented Nazi atrocities “with such authenticity and in such detail that there can be no
responsible denial of these crimes in the future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders

34

U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. U.N. Doc. S/PV.3217 (May 25, 1993) (statement by U.S. Representative Mrs.
Albright).
35
Minna Schrag, Lessons Learned from ICTY Experience, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 427, 428 (2004).
36
Art. 65(4) of the Rome Statute foresees that the trial can be continued notwithstanding a guilty plea when a more
complete presentation of the facts is required in the interest of justice.
37
See PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY 24-27 (2001).
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can arise among informed people.”38 Finally, international criminal tribunals provide a common
history that hopefully helps build bridges over rifts in conflict-ridden societies.
Many argue that trials are not effective to expose the truth because they are limited in
finding whether the criminal standard of proof has been satisfied on specific charges. Even
though a measure of truth may emerge from the criminal proceedings, trials are limited in their
truth-finding ability since they must comply with rules of evidence, which often exclude
important information.39 It is true that in domestic criminal proceedings the “law puts a
magnifying glass on the criminal’s conduct, leaving only a small and often distorted image of
everything else.”40 But because of the nature of the crimes heard before international tribunals, in
contrast to a typical criminal proceeding, the proof of the “chapeau elements” of these crimes
requires the establishment of more than simply the accused criminal’s conduct.41 For example, to
convict an individual under genocide, the Court must establish the intent to destroy a substantial
portion of the civil population. Likewise, to prosecute for grave breaches under the Geneva
Conventions, the prosecution must prove that the offenses took place in the context of an armed
conflict. The distinctive feature of crimes against humanity is a widespread and/or systematic
attack against the civilian population. Even though the basic crime might be very limited, the
proof established during trial proceedings of the larger context in which it is committed, which
makes the crime an international one, can contribute to the establishment of the historical record.
Although the historical record established by a tribunal dealing with international crimes
might be more important than a record created by courts prosecuting “ordinary” crimes, a Truth

38

Scharf, supra note 16, at 1078 (quoting Report to the President from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel
for the United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, 7 June 1945, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. (Supp.
1945), at 178).
39
Hayner, supra note 37, at 100.
40
Damaška, supra note 12, at 1031.
41
Id. at 1031-1032.
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and Reconciliation Commission might provide a broader focus and experience fewer constraints
in receiving testimony. On the other hand, the facts established by a court might exhibit a
heightened legitimacy since they are the product of an adversarial and contradictory trial wearing
the tight corset of procedural and evidentiary rules.
b)

Does Plea-Bargaining Undermine the Aspiration of Courts to Establish the Truth?
The ICTY regards the establishment of the truth as an important aspect of its mandate. As

the Trial Chamber expressed in Erdemovic,
The International Tribunal, in addition to its mandate to investigate, prosecute and
punish serious violations of international humanitarian law, has a duty, through its
judicial functions, to contribute to the settlement of the wider issues of
accountability, reconciliation and establishing the truth behind the evils
perpetrated in the former Yugoslavia.42
The ICTY considers that the use of plea-bargaining does not hinder the establishment of the
truth, and in fact, it has repeatedly affirmed that guilty pleas are an important and direct
contribution to the truth-finding function of the Tribunal.43 The ICTY’s main argument in
support of its position is that a plea agreement renders it more likely that the concerned people
will accept the historical record,44 as there is a profound difference between facts found by a
judge and facts admitted by an accused, specifically with regards to the method of how the facts
are obtained and their potential for promoting reconciliation.45 For example, an accused that
maintains his innocence even after the end of the proceedings would set the stage for endless
debates about the correctness of the Court’s historical record, whereas an “admission of guilt
proffered by a defendant with such sterling nationalist credentials as the Serbian Iron Lady …
42

Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis, ¶ 21 (March 5, 1998) (sentencing judgment) (emphasis added).
See Prosecutor v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, ¶ 149 (Nov. 13, 2001) (sentencing judgment); see also Prosecutor
v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 76 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
44
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 72 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
45
Combs, supra note 3, at 149.
43
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provides strong evidence to counteract the self-serving histories that still hold sway among
Serbs.”46
The question is what kind of historical record is more desirable for international tribunals
to establish: a negotiated historical record that is generally acceptable or an accurate one, where
some might have to bite the bullet of a harsh judgment. The search for the “whole truth” is the
more desirable alternative since only an accurate and solid historical record will endure and
prevent revisionist tendencies. Thus, a thorough examination of evidence in proceedings on the
merits is necessary given that “agreement and compromise are as unreliable paths to fact-finding
accuracy in adjudication as they are in other fields.”47
Several aspects of plea-bargaining seriously impoverish the search for the “whole truth.”
First, the Trial Chamber admitted in Nikoliü that “[i]n cases where factual allegations are
withdrawn, the public record established by that case might be incomplete or at least open to
question, as the public will not know whether the allegations were withdrawn because of
insufficient evidence or because they were simply a ‘bargaining’ chip.”48 The Trial Chamber
thus emphasized the importance of considering the “totality of an individual’s criminal
conduct,”49 but it is nevertheless disposed to make compromises on the legal qualification of this
conduct. A common bargaining pattern consists of dropping the genocide count in exchange for
an admission of guilt for a crime against humanity for the same fact pattern.50 But even in cases
where the factual basis underlying the conduct charged is not reduced by a plea agreement, the
importance of the legal qualification of this conduct should not be underestimated. Not only
might the stigma attached to genocide (the crime of crimes) be greater compared to a conviction
46

Nancy Amoury Combs, Prosecutor v. Plavšiü, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 929, 936 (2003).
Damaška, supra note 12, at 1032.
48
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 63 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
49
Id. at ¶ 65.
50
Prosecutor v. Plavšiü, Case No. IT-00-39&40-PT, Plea Agreement, ¶ 9 (Sept. 30, 2002).
47
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for war crimes or crimes against humanity, but dropping the genocide charge might also
erroneously be perceived as an admission by the Prosecutor that this crime did not take place
and, hence, ultimately facilitate denial.
Furthermore, the establishment of truth might be hampered due to the considerably
poorer historical trace that plea-bargaining leaves behind compared to full-fledged proceedings.
The ICTY’s practice of letting the accused that is pleading guilty sign a factual basis of a few
pages is only the “merest bare-bones history” of the accused’s involvement in the crimes
compared to judgments that often exceed hundreds of pages and are built upon ample evidence.51
Finally, the question of whether a bargained truth is better received than one established through
criminal proceedings might depend on the addressee. For example, a victim might perceive his
tormentor’s guilty plea as a result of a clever risk assessment serving the self-interest of the
accused rather than a result of establishing the truth in order to lay the foundation for dialogue
and reconciliation.52
2.

Is Plea-Bargaining Reconcilable with the Nature of the Crimes and the Duty to
Prosecute?
To put an end to the impunity of perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against

humanity through their effective prosecution is the paramount goal of every international
criminal tribunal. Crimes prosecuted by international criminal courts belong to the most
reprehensible forms of criminality. The extraordinary evil they incarnate affects the desirability
of plea-bargaining before international instances in a negative way. Many national procedural
laws reflect the principle that the more serious the crimes allegedly committed, the more
51

Scharf, supra note 16, at 1080.
Combs, supra note 3, at 148-149 (stating that empirical studies in the domestic context indicate that good
judgment of the risks and self-interest inspire most of the guilty pleas, not honesty, responsibility, or any other
virtue).

52

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 16

appropriate it is for the perpetrators to be subject to imposed rather than negotiated justice, and in
cases of the most serious crimes, they do not allow bargained outcomes at all.53 How can pleabargaining be justified a fortiori in the realm of international justice? Is plea-bargaining
reconcilable with the duty to prosecute and to impose a sentence proportionate to the gravity of
the criminal conduct?
a)

Duty to Prosecute: An Obstacle to Plea-Agreements?
When Judge Cassese presented the initially adopted Rules of Procedure and Evidence of

the ICTY, he stressed that no one should be immune from prosecution for crimes of such
magnitude; therefore, plea-bargaining had not found its way into the Rules.54 Immunity in fact
collides with the duty to prosecute and to impose effective sentences. This duty is namely laid
out in the 1948 Genocide Convention, which requires prosecution and effective penalties for the
crime of genocide.55 The four Geneva Conventions oblige the High Contracting Parties to
prosecute grave breaches of the Conventions and to enact effective penal sanctions.56 Customary
international law also requires the investigation and prosecution of war crimes.57
The duty to prosecute does not extinguish prosecutorial discretion entirely. In light of
limited resources, the Prosecutor must carefully choose which suspected perpetrators to
prosecute as well as what to charge them with. But in cases where the Prosecutor indicts a
person for genocide, approving a plea agreement and dropping this grave charge simply to
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expedite the caseload seems incompatible with the duty to prosecute.58 Indictments for genocide
are not issued out of the blue. The Prosecutor must first demonstrate that there is sufficient
evidence to provide reasonable grounds for believing that a suspect has committed this crime,
and then the charge must also be confirmed by a judge.59 Once this prima facie case for the most
reprehensible crime is established, Art. 4 and 5 of the Genocide Convention demand its
prosecution and punishment. To sacrifice a count of genocide for judicial economy seems
incompatible with the spirit of this international treaty.
Some argue that the statutes for the ICC and the ad hoc Tribunals only incorporate the
substantive provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the Genocide Convention and not the
procedural aspects of the treaties that require prosecution and punishment. Thus, because the
international courts have a juridical personality independent from the states that ratified these
conventions, the obligation to prosecute does not follow.60 There is, however, a response to this
argument. States have a duty to prosecute international crimes based on various treaties and by
virtue of international customary law. According to international customary law, states may
discharge their obligation to investigate and prosecute the suspects by setting up international or
mixed tribunals.61 Based on the principle that the sum of rights and obligations imposed on a
state must not be diminished through delegation, both the substantial and the procedural content
of these conventions must migrate to the international level. Furthermore, the very reason for
which international tribunals are created - to assure prosecution in cases where a state is not able
or willing to realize its duty to prosecute - contradicts the proposition that this principle should
not be applicable in the realm of international justice.
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b)

Plea-Bargaining Despite the Nature of the Crimes and the Duty to Prosecute?
At first, the ICTY only used sentence bargaining, but Plavšiü permitted charge bargaining

for the first time in the ICTY’s existence. In Plavšiü, the accused had served as a deputy to
Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžiü and had been charged with two counts of committing
genocide and complicity in genocide and six counts of committing crimes against humanity
against Bosnian Muslims. In exchange for her guilty plea on one count of persecution (a crime
against humanity), all other charges were dropped.62 Following this landmark case, there have
been other convictions on lesser counts than genocide in exchange for guilty pleas.63 The ICTY,
however, is not insensitive towards the problems that arise from the practice of charge reduction
and states that any negotiation on a charge of genocide or crimes against humanity “must be
carefully considered and be entered into for good cause” because of the prosecutor’s duty to
prosecute serious violations of international humanitarian law and the fundamentally different
nature of the crimes within in its jurisdiction compared to those prosecuted nationally.64 The
ICTY then goes on to distinguish between situations in which the remaining charge(s) still reflect
the totality of an individual’s criminal conduct and those where the plea agreement simply
reflects what the parties perceive as a suitable settlement of the matter by blinding out substantial
parts of the indicted’s criminal conduct.65 As a reconciliatory position, the ICTY concludes that,
in the latter case, charge dropping would spurn the goals of international justice, but it
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nevertheless allows for the withdrawal of charges in the former case, i.e. where the totality of
criminal conduct is taken into account.66
The ICTY’s practice of taking into account the totality of criminal conduct but convicting
only for a lesser crime raises another question: Whether there is a duty to prosecute international
crimes under all permissible legal characterizations once the underlying facts are established?67
It is true that the relationship between the different crimes is not authoritatively established in
international law, but as an analogy to national criminal law, priority should be given to the most
serious crimes, regardless of whether the same factual allegation can be prosecuted cumulatively
under a further charge. When certain conduct is solely prosecuted under the title of war crimes or
crimes against humanity rather than genocide, this might reflect the totality of the defendant’s
acts but it might not fully mirror their degree of unlawfulness. This situation, in turn, renders it
impossible for the court to impose a penal sanction fully reflecting the seriousness of the crime
and the degree of culpability.68 Therefore, the ICTY’s admission of charge bargaining in cases
where the totality of the defendant’s acts is reflected, but not where the degree of unlawfulness is
fully mirrored, might be questionable.
In some cases before the ICTY, it was contended whether the plea agreement would
reflect the totality of an individual’s criminal conduct. In the sentencing judgment following the
plea agreement in Deronjiü, Presiding Judge Schomburg dissented mainly because the factual
basis contained in the plea agreement provided an arbitrary, selective account of the facts and did
not reflect the defendant’s participation in the much larger criminal plan of ethnic cleansing.69
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Judge Schomburg’s dissent demonstrates that the test developed by the ICTY concerning charge
bargaining might pose problems in practice, because it is not always obvious whether the
remaining charges accurately reflect the actual conduct and crime committed. If the remaining
charges do not, the argument that charge bargaining can violate the duty to prosecute gains
momentum.
3.

Plea-Bargaining from the Victim’s and the Accused’s Perspective
The paramount goal of international criminal tribunals is to convict and punish those

most responsible for committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. It is hoped
that convictions will contribute to the prevention of these types of crimes, which concern the
international community as a whole, by putting an end to impunity for the perpetrators.70
Furthermore, the tribunals aspire to contribute to the restoration and maintenance of peace
through criminal proceedings. By convicting individuals for their crimes, an assumption of guilt
can be removed from the collective body they represent, which prevents an entire ethnic or
religious group from being held responsible for the conduct of a few individuals.71
But does plea-bargaining also carries the risk of convicting innocent people while offering
excessive leniency to those bearing responsibility, and thus frustrate the principle of just desert?
From the victim’s perspective, the fact that covert dealings between the prosecution and defense
take place will raise doubts as to whether or not the principle of just desert is realized.72 As pleabargaining ultimately leads to avoiding trial, the victims also lose the opportunity to have their
voices heard.73 The question of whether plea-bargaining hampers or furthers the victim’s

70

See Preamble of the Rome Statute.
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 60 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
72
Bohlander, supra note 9, at 162.
73
Prosecutor v. Nikoliü, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 62 (Dec. 2, 2003) (sentencing judgment).
71

8 Chi-Kent J. Int’l & Comp. L. 21

interests, as well as the accused’s, is examined below.
a)

Is Plea-Bargaining an Obstacle to Realizing the Victim’s Interests?
In Plavsiü, it was argued that the use of plea-bargaining could be advantageous for the

victims insofar as it relieves them from the ordeal of giving testimony.74 Hence, a second
traumatization through proceedings could be prevented75 and the risks resulting from testifying,
such as retaliation, would be avoided. A further benefit of plea-bargaining from the victim’s
perspective can be seen in the potential to obtain judgments within a shorter period of time as
compared to the time necessary to conduct a full-blown trial on the merits.76 The time saved, in
turn, would allow the investigation and prosecution of more cases, and thus more victims would
have their suffering officially recognized and acknowledged by international tribunals. Finally, it
could be argued that victims are, first and foremost, interested in a conviction. So, while the
severity of the sentence and the legal qualification of the crime are secondary concerns and pleabargaining is a means to secure a conviction, its use would nevertheless ensure the satisfaction of
at least one of the victim’s interests.
These arguments rest on the assumption that victims prefer to avoid participation in trial
proceedings and that their interest in the qualitative outcome of a prosecution is limited. This
assumption, quite to the contrary, might not be true. Criminological research in domestic systems
tends to show that the severity of the sentence matters to the victim and that victims very often
want their day in court in order to confront the accused with their grievance. If this applies to
ordinary criminality, it follows that it is much truer in the case of the extraordinary evil that is the
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subject of proceedings before international courts.77 From a victim’s perspective, a criminal trial
can restore and promote a sense of agency, i.e. the impression that a certain control over the acts
and events that affected them can be exercised - especially when that sense was destroyed by the
very conduct constituting the object of the indictment. Egregious crimes involve not only
physical harm but also the denial of dignity, personal integrity, and autonomy. The mere act of
reconceptualizing oneself as a participant of a criminal trial and possibly even as the holder of
rights78 can offer a sense of empowerment.79 This sense of empowerment might be destroyed by
the use of plea-bargaining - a covert deal between prosecution and defense with which the victim
is not associated. Victims may not understand why their tormentors are allowed to escape public
exposure and scrutiny and “hide behind an agreement with the very institution that is supposed to
ensure that justice is being done to the victims.”80
There is a certain tension between the victim’s interest in having a full trial for its
cathartic effect and the tribunal’s interest in encouraging and rewarding guilty pleas. Victims do
not dispose of a procedural device to request a full trial in order to have their voices heard if the
court is willing to accept the guilty plea.81 The Rome Statute makes some accommodation for
these conflicting interests in Article 65(4), under which the Trial Chamber may request that the
prosecutor present additional evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, or even order the
trial to be continued under the ordinary trial procedures if it is “of the opinion that a more
complete presentation of the facts of the case is required in the interests of justice, in particular in
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the interests of the victims.”82 This provision, in conjunction with Article 68(3) of the Rome
Statute, which is designed to ensure that the Court allows the “views and concerns” of victims to
be presented and considered at any stage in the proceeding where the “personal interests of the
victims are affected” raises the hope that victims interests will be given appropriate weight in the
decision whether to have a full-fledged trial.83
b)

Plea-Bargaining from the Accused’s Perspective: A Mixed Blessing
From a defendant’s perspective, plea-bargaining is a mixed blessing. Doubtlessly, there

are some clear advantages for the accused to enter a guilty plea agreement. According to Judge
Cassese, an accused individual may find it beneficial to plead guilty for three reasons.
Firstly, it may help him salve his conscience and atone for his wrongdoing.
Secondly, he will avoid the indignity and the possible demoralisation of
undergoing a trial, as well as the psychological ordeal he would have to go
through during examination and cross-examination of witnesses . . . he will also
eschew the public exposure that may ensue from trial, and the adverse
consequences for his social position and the life of his family and relatives.
Thirdly, the accused may expect that the court will recognise his cooperative
attitude by reducing the sentence it would have imposed had there not been a plea
of guilty: in other words, the accused may hope that the court will be more lenient
in recognition of his admission of guilt.84
Moreover, in charge bargaining, a plea agreement gives the accused the ability to admit guilt in
exchange for a lesser charge and thereby avoid conviction for a more serious crime.
The downside of all these advantages, however, is their potential to induce an innocent
accused individual to admit guilt. The prospect of a certain, reduced penalty or the conviction for
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a lesser charge rather than incurring the risk of a conviction for a more serious crime may
especially prompt the risk averse defendant to plead guilty.85 This problematic feature of pleabargaining is not unique to its use in the international sphere. The gravity of, and the stigma
attached to, the crimes falling in the jurisdiction of international criminal courts, however,
amplifies the problem of waiving the right to be presumed innocent and sacrificing the benefit of
having the prosecution bear the burden of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a
public trial.
IV.

Drawbacks Outweighed by Securing Administrative Efficiency?

1.

Complexity of Procedure: An Explanation for the Increased Use of Plea-Bargaining
In the United States, plea-bargaining developed primarily as a response to the

introduction of increasingly complex and time-consuming criminal procedures and the soaring
docket during the twentieth century. The system was no longer able to try all accused individuals
in full-blown trials, thus plea-bargaining was increasingly used to evade those procedures.86 In
1971, the United States criminal system had become so dependent on this trial avoidance
mechanism that the Supreme Court in Santobello v. New York designated plea-bargaining as an
essential component of the administration of justice which should be encouraged when properly
administered.87 The Court stated that if every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial,
the number of judges and court facilities would have to be multiplied by many times.88
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Combs has established a correlation between the complexity of procedures and the
prevalence of plea-bargaining: the more complex and costly the criminal proceedings are the
more often plea-bargaining will be used to evade those procedures.89 Indeed, procedures before
international tribunals are complex and very time consuming. This is in large part due to the
difficulty inherent in the proof of the “chapeau elements” of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity. For example, to establish that a basic crime such as murder was committed as
a part of a systematic and widespread attack goes far beyond what must be proven in a trial
concerning ordinary criminality.90 But also, collecting evidence is more arduous and time
consuming as the court is not situated at the locus delicti and does not have the same arsenal of
subpoena measures as a national court equipped with a proper police force. Furthermore, the
likelihood that victim and witness protection measures are necessary is greater than in the
average domestic procedure. Finally, different logistical measures such as translation into several
languages and the transportation and hosting of witnesses and victims are not only costly but also
very time consuming.91 Hence, in the light of the correlation proposed by Combs, the use of
plea-bargaining by international courts does not come as such a surprise. The ICTY, however,
has provided a much different explanation for its use of plea-bargaining after having initially
rejected its introduction in the ICTY-RPE.
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2.

Explanation Provided by the ICTY: Furthering the Mandate or Administrative
Efficiency?
In various sentencing judgments, the ICTY has considered saving time and resources as a

valuable and justifiable reason for the promotion of guilty pleas. The mechanism of the guilty
plea was praised for “securing administrative efficiency,”92 “substantial saving of international
time and resources,”93 and saving “the International Tribunal the time and effort of a lengthy
investigation and trial.”94 Hence, the main justification, or at least a major justification, given by
the Tribunal for the use of plea-bargaining is administrative efficiency.
But in Nikoliü, the Trial Chamber tried “to divorce itself from the administrative
efficiency argument.”95 In this first principled discussion of plea-bargaining, the Chamber wrote
that it could not fully endorse the argument that saving time and resources would be a valuable
and justifiable reason for the promotion of guilty pleas.96 Given the magnitude of the cases and
the fact that the Tribunal was entrusted by the international community to bring justice to the
former Yugoslavia, saving resources could not be given undue consideration or importance.
Considering that the quality of justice and the fulfillment of the mandate should not be
compromised and that its very raison d’être would be to conduct criminal proceedings, the
Tribunal came to the conclusion that “while savings of time and resources may be a result of
guilty pleas, this consideration should not be the main reason for promoting guilty pleas through
plea agreements.”97 This statement raises the question what, if not administrative efficiency,
should be the reason for the use of plea-bargaining?
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In Nikoliü, the Trial Chamber found “that, on balance, guilty pleas pursuant to plea
agreements, may further the work – and the mandate – of the Tribunal.”98 As plea-bargaining
would secure convictions and possibly elicit evidence crucial for other prosecutions, it would
lead directly to the fulfillment of a fundamental purpose of the Tribunal.99 The acceptance of
responsibility by the accused as well as the underlying facts established in the case of a plea
agreement would make denial no longer possible, and thus another purpose of the court would be
fulfilled. Finally, plea-bargaining would also contribute to restoring peace and justice and bring
reconciliation, because a guilty plea may be more meaningful to the victims and survivors than a
finding of guilt by a trial. Thus, the guilty plea would represent a first step in the reconciliation
dialogue.100
While I am not able to see behind the curtain of the ICTY, it seems to me that
administrative efficiency and judicial economy played a more important role than was admitted
in the Nikoliü Tribunal’s decision to eventually admit plea-bargaining. In my opinion, time and
resource savings and case completion were not simply the result but rather the reason for
introducing this trial-avoidance mechanism. The timing of its introduction, after the docket had
grown considerably and the efficiency and completion discussion was launched,101 supports this
conclusion. Furthermore, the initial rejection of plea-bargaining102 for the very reason that
granting immunity to perpetrators of the most serious crimes would be incompatible with the
mandate of the Tribunal renders the justification that plea-bargaining would further the work and
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mandate of the ICTY less convincing. Finally, the explanation given in the United States and its
Supreme Court for the use of plea-bargaining cannot be ignored.
3.

Balancing of Interests: Mandate versus Administrative Efficiency
Even though the use of plea-bargaining can further the goals of international justice under

certain circumstances, this does not seem to justify its increased use, especially in view of its
equal or even greater potential to distort and compromise the goals of international courts: the
duty to prosecute, the establishment of a historical record, and the realization of the victim’s
interests. As the Trial Chamber in Nikoliü stressed, negotiations in criminal proceedings for
international crimes should be “carefully considered” and only “entered into for good cause.”103
Additionally, against the background of the nature of the international crimes, which
strike at the heart of peaceful co-existence, the argument of practical utility loses much of its
force. It is questionable whether negotiations can be “entered [into] for good cause,” if only
justified by securing administrative efficiency. The ICTY itself has argued that time and resource
savings would not be a valuable and justifiable reason for accepting negotiated outcomes in
criminal proceedings, and that only the furtherance of the Tribunal’s goals could serve as a
legitimate ground for its introduction.104 But once we conclude that plea-bargaining can
compromise these goals, there is no longer a solid justification available for its use.
If we follow Scharf’s argument that plea-bargaining is not a functional necessity of
international courts, the justification of plea-bargaining with an argument of judicial economy
loses even more ground. He argues that plea-bargaining could be avoided by adequately funding
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and staffing international tribunals.105 Bohlander also advocates for restrained use of pleabargaining and states, “If the international community is serious about international criminal
prosecution of those responsible for atrocities . . . then it must be prepared to fund this enterprise
accordingly in order to be able to afford full public trials and at the same time to avoid
overloaded dockets.”106
V.

Conclusion
An examination of the practice at the ICTY and the normative framework of the Rome

Statute reveals that the use of negotiated justice, rather than imposed justice, before international
criminal tribunals has become a reality. The use of plea-bargaining entails the risk of
compromising the goals and mandate of international criminal courts, which goes beyond the
purposes of domestic criminal proceedings mainly consisting of retribution, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and prevention. An excessive recourse to this trial-avoidance mechanism not only
distorts the historical record and the establishment of truth but also conflicts with the duty to
prosecute and the principle of just desert. Finally, plea-bargaining is a mixed blessing for both
the victims and the accused. Given all these drawbacks with regard to the mandate of
international courts and the weak justification of administrative efficiency on which pleabargaining rests, I advocate for giving priority to imposed justice rather than negotiated justice.
We have seen that judges have a considerable amount of discretion over whether or not to accept
plea agreements. Furthermore, the Rome Statute explicitly states that the presentation of
additional evidence or even conducting a full-fledged trial can be required if in the interest of
justice, and in particular, the victims’ interests. Hopefully, judges will exercise this discretion in
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a way that best furthers the goals of these institutions set up for the prosecution of the most
reprehensible form of criminality.
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